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REVIEWS OF BOOKS.

Immanuel Kant, Sein Leben und seine Lehre. Von FRIEDRICH PAULSEN. Mit Bildnis und einem Briefe Kants aus dem Jahre 1792, Stuttgart, Fr. Frommann's Verlag, 1898.—pp. xii, 396.

A new book by Paulsen is now-a-days in Germany a literary event of the first order. His *Versuch einer Entwicklungsgeschichte der Kantischen Erkenntnisstheorie* (1875) was received in Kantian circles with the utmost favor, and his *Geschichte des gelehrten Unterrichts in Deutschland* made him a literary personality much talked of throughout the Empire. This latter work, by its unsparing exposure of the defects of the Classical Gymnasium, became a decisive factor in the controversy between Humanism and Realism in the contemporary reform-movement. Paulsen further established his literary reputation by his *Ethik*, which has gone into several editions, as well as by his widely read *Einleitung in die Philosophie*. He is a much admired author and with good reason: he writes in a clear, transparent style, and understands how to reduce the most difficult philosophical problems to simple expression. He is a sharp, though not unfair, controversialist; and he deals his blows right and left in the most telling way. His manner is popular without being trivial. His style evidences refined discrimination, but is all the while natural.

After twenty-three years he now returns to writing on Kant. At the time of the publication of his first work on the same subject (1875), there was just commencing that invasive Kant movement, which has been characterized by the not very fortunate expression "Kantphilologie." Paulsen, through his book, contributed largely to the creation of this movement. His work *Die Entwicklungsgeschichte Kants* profoundly influenced all later investigations. But from that time on Paulsen took no further part in the "Kantphilology." He defined his own attitude to Kant, however, in an interesting jubilee article, published in the *Vierteljahresschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie* (1881), and entitled "Was uns Kant sein kann." In his *Einleitung in die Philosophie*, he writes with constant reference to Kant: one sees here how he is in every instance endeavoring to leave the kernel while he strips the husk away. Both tendencies, the earlier historico-philosophical and the later critico-systematic, are united in the new book. By means of searching historical analysis, Paulsen endeavors to establish the permanently valuable kernel of the Kantian philosophy,

and to show how the kernel, through the conditions of time and place, had become enveloped in the husk. Whoever wishes to discover the kernel of Kant's philosophy cannot leave out of account the essential personality of the philosopher. It is with good reason, therefore, that the author describes in Part I (pp. 21-104) "Kant's Life and Philosophical Development." Paulsen here makes use of the comparison of Kant with Socrates, so often employed by others. Nowhere can one so well observe the art of a good writer as where he has to repeat what is well known; he makes the hackneyed appear as fresh as if it had found expression for the first time. And this is true of what he says regarding this striking parallelism. In this parallel there is lacking, it is true, the final element, as Paulsen points out (p. 50). Socrates died a martyr to his convictions in his seventieth year; Kant at the same age showed in the face of opposition "more caution than courage." Paulsen correctly defends this bearing on Kant's part on the ground that his health at that time was much impaired. He might also have said: Socrates was throughout his life a robust character, and therefore a controversial nature who drew freely from the fulness of his strength. Kant, on the other hand, was obliged all his life to be sparing of his strength, and had no superfluous power to spend on a world that thought differently from himself. And here, as in his entire life and doctrine, that element of his personality comes to expression, which I would note as the most characteristic thing in Kant: *The power of the spirit within the limits set to it.* As he emphasized this power of the spirit in his life even into the smallest particulars, so it is also the chief note in his entire philosophy: To do justice to the mighty power of the spirit, of the intellectual and moral spirit,—but within the limits and boundaries set to it. In all that Kant says, I find this ever-recurring *motif*: a deep conviction of the native powers of the theoretical and practical spirit in man, accompanied by an equally deep conviction of the narrow limits within which the spirit can exercise this power. In this I find the simplest, unitary formula for Kant's life and doctrine, for his epistemology and for his ethics.

The same formula contains within it, as a mathematical formula, also the entire history of Kant's development. The three periods, then, of this development, which Paulsen correctly distinguishes (p. 75): (1) the dogmatic-rationalistic, (2) the sceptic-empiristic, and (3) the critico-rationalistic, are related to each other in the following way: in the first period Kant, in common with dogmatism, believes in the unlimited power of the spirit; in the second period, on the other hand, in common with empiricism, the limits of this power were, quite as one-

sidedly exaggerated ; and only in the third period does Kant develop the peculiar character of his criticism,—the conviction of the spirit's power within the limits set to it.

The following opinion of Paulsen (p. 76) is very attractive to me : the transformations in Kant's thought, the *Umkippungen* of which he speaks, concern the form more than the content, his epistemology more than his metaphysics. His metaphysics, in the midst of all the changes in other parts of his system, remained essentially the same : it is an idealism based on Leibnitz (and Plato). We can follow him from his writings in the fifties to the lectures in the last decade of the century. The changes in standpoint here affect mainly the form of the epistemological substructure of his metaphysic (*Weltanschauungen*), the "method of metaphysic," as he says himself. Paulsen emphasizes the constant factor more strongly than is customary, whereas heretofore Kant's variability had been unduly emphasized. This view of Paulsen, I repeat, commends itself to me. It coincides entirely with the above-stated formula : only in the first period did Kant emphasize more the power than the limits of the spirit ; in the second, more the limits than the power ; in neither of the two periods has he exalted the one factor to the exclusion of the other ; but he did not discover the right poise of the two elements until the third or critical period.

The most characteristic thing in Paulsen's new book is his insistent assertion that even in the critical period, Kant's activity was directed to a positive re-establishment of metaphysics. "Kant's purpose is to build up, not tear asunder, or to tear asunder only for the end of clearing ground for the necessary new structure." His purpose in building is twofold : (1) to establish a positive theory of knowledge, namely, a rationalistic theory of the sciences ; (2) a positive metaphysic, namely, an idealistic theory of the world (p. 118). According to other passages in Paulsen, however, Kant's final aim was directed entirely to the establishment of an idealistic metaphysic : "reality in itself is a system of existing ideas (p. 271), which are united by means of logico-teleological relationships, and are present to the divine mind as intuitions" (p. 272). Kant thinks of the world fundamentally as "a system of monads which by means of *influxus idealis* . . . are combined into a unity" (p. 273). "Reality is a system, complete in itself, of eternal entities, which are formed into a unity by means of intrinsic teleological relationships" (p. 280). "The aim of all Kant's efforts is the establishment of a scientifically tenable metaphysic on the basis of a new method" (p. 279). Paulsen, therefore, contrary to all precedents in

earlier expositions of Kant's philosophy, devotes a separate section to *Kant's Metaphysics* (pp. 237-282). The insertion of this chapter, combined with the sharply maintained position regarding Kant's positive-idealistic metaphysics, has naturally awakened much comment and caused much head-shaking : Kant, the severe critic of all metaphysic, himself a metaphysician ? I have been asked from various quarters whether this exposition of Kant's philosophy is valid or not, running directly counter as it does to the ordinary interpretations. To this question I can only reply : yes and no. Yes ! Paulsen's exposition is essentially correct. He has supported his interpretation by sound arguments and conclusive citations. But I must also answer : no ! the exposition is not entirely correct, because what Kant permitted to glimmer only through a veil, Paulsen without this critical veil sets in the clearest light of day. Kant did, it is true, even in the period of criticism (apart from certain instances of scepticism, whose traces are not obliterated), hold firmly to the conviction : true reality is a teleological system of spiritual entities, held together in a divine being. But he never gave this such bald expression ; he concealed it under a thousand ambiguities ; he never maintained these theses directly, but always merely as indirect postulates of the practical reason, and such "practical postulates" are something very different from theoretical hypotheses. *The veil*, which Kant draws before this intelligible world, is a necessary element of his critical system. Paulsen, however, removes the veil : in that instant we have no longer the genuine critical philosophy of Kant. The most characteristic thing in Kant's criticism is that he conceals the intelligible world behind this veil, and at the same time allows it to glimmer through the concealing veil. Paulsen has himself observed this. In an inimitably beautiful passage (p. 244) he says : " The metaphysic of Kant has certainly something like a play of colors in it, something shifting between knowing and not-knowing. Upon every statement ' It is so,' there follows, ' Properly speaking it is not so,' and then again finally, ' It is notwithstanding so.' " Paulsen seems to regard this as a defect in Kant. I regard it, on the other hand, as an excellence.

It is precisely this indecision that is the peculiar mark of the critical philosophy. Exceedingly few men can tolerate this wavering, and consequently move on to a positive or negative dogmatism, because they require a fixed position. Paulsen is right in saying that Kant's metaphysical idealism is based on Plato. Is the case at all different with Plato ? Did not Plato introduce his own final metaphysical theories in the form of *μύθοι*, where the positive element in

indistinct outline, glimmers through as from behind a veil? In this sense Plato, the decried dogmatist, is father of the critical philosophy. And it is only in this sense that the skepticism of the Academy could have developed from him. It would be worth while to consider Plato from this side: the Platonic *μύθοι* are the direct predecessors of the 'postulates' of Kant. When we remove the mythical garb from his dogmas, we no longer have the genuine Plato; and, if we want to find the real Kant, we must not interpret apart from the veil what he, "with more caution than courage," concealed behind it. If we remove the veil from Kant's system, what comes to view is Leibniz's monad-world. If, however, we remove the veil, we no longer have Kant's own philosophy; for this veil is a part of his philosophy. In this particular, I believe that Paulsen is substantially in agreement with me. I am here concerned with formally emphasizing this substantial agreement. I grant Paulsen's correctness when he says: "Although here and there in the *Kritik d. r. V.* Kant has the appearance of an agnostic, yet whenever he expresses himself directly in his own personal thinking, as in his lectures or lecture-notes, we always meet the genuine Platonist; and whoever does not take the Platonist into consideration will not understand the critical philosopher" (Vorwort, p. vii). I grant this; but Paulsen further remarks that we must distinguish in Kant's thinking between his personal and private views and those of an impersonal and official kind. I do not believe we should ignore the private opinion of Kant; but I believe that in the interpretation of his philosophy his official and published opinions are to be kept sharply distinguished from his private opinions, which he, in keeping with the critical basis of his philosophy, never obtrudes upon us in the manner of the dogmatists; but he merely attempts to indicate in harmony with the spirit of his criticism what metaphysical hypotheses are to be regarded as merely "hazardous adventures of the reason." Paulsen is right in maintaining that we only half know Kant when we neglect his metaphysic, with which Kant himself confessed he had fallen in love. Paulsen says in the preface (p. viii): "If this exposition should contribute a little to inspire courage in an idealistic metaphysic, which in these latter days has begun to venture into the light, by showing that Kant is no forbidding or threatening name, but a kindly disposed patron, I should be glad." Seeing that this spirit in Kantian interpretation prevails in England and America, it is especially in these countries that Paulsen's book will be given the most cordial welcome.

In agreement with the foregoing, Paulsen rightly lays strong empha-

sis on Kant's effort to mediate between science and religion, and thereby "to establish the unity of spiritual life" (p. 2; cf. also pp. 118, 157, 204, 338, 381 seqq.). In this Paulsen sees one of the three "great fundamental ideas" of Kant which are fitted to form the "permanent basis of philosophy" (pp. 381 ff.). These are: (1) The philosophy of Kant correctly grasped the essential nature of *knowledge and faith*. It thereby solved the central problem of modern philosophy, which had confronted it since the 17th century, owing to the schism between science and religion. Kant gave to knowledge what belonged to knowledge, and to faith what belonged to faith. (2) Kant assigned to will its proper place in the world. He overthrew the one-sided intellectualism of the 18th century. (3) Kant gave to spirit the correct determination of its nature and the place that belongs to it in the world. He gave the creative power of spirit its due: its essence is freedom. Paulsen here concerns himself with the fundamental formula of Kant's philosophy, as above stated: the power of the spirit within its prescribed limits.

Paulsen's book presents, further, a great many interesting points of view, a wealth of suggestion, an array of happy turns of thought and striking ideas. I should be glad to go into the details of various features of the book, but the space allotted me forbids it. Especially I should like to examine the reviews of Paulsen's book by Adickes and Barth, the former published in the *Deutsche Literaturzeitung* (1898, No. 291), and the latter in the *Kantstudien* (Bd. iii, Heft i and ii), in both of which, fundamental questions in the interpretation of Kantian philosophy are considered. I shall find, however, in Vol. III of my *Commentar zu Kant's Kr. d. r. V.* opportunity to go into these questions, whose solutions have been in certain instances much advanced by Paulsen, who possesses the rare art of combining popular statement with scientific investigation. His new book is a masterpiece, on which we congratulate him, and yet we have greater reason to congratulate ourselves on the acquisition of such an excellent exposition of Kant.

H. VAHINGER.

HALLE, A. S.

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This annual appears as heretofore in two parts. The first, comprising about three-fifths of the volume, is made up of three original articles; the second part is devoted to reviews of books, more or less